Debate question
Apart from political system in which the state is committed to an explicit set of ideological goals, all or most civil servants are expected to be politically impartial, in the sense that they do not allow their own views and preferences to affect their professional activities. But is neutrality in this sense possible? Can administration be kept separate from politics, or may political impartiality be a mere presence, concealing the pursuit of self-interest or other biases?
YES
- Civil servants as rational actors. Civil servants differ fundamentally from politicians, in that they are primarily concerned with the rational and efficient organisation of society, not the pursuit of partisan advantage. According to Max Weber, bureaucracy us a reliable, predictable and, above all, efficient means of social organisation. Bureaucratic organisation offers civil servants very little scope for personal discretion because they operate within a firmly ordered hierarchy, in which lower offices are closely supervised by higher ones; an emphasis is placed on evidence-based, rational decision-making; and appointment and advancement are determined by strictly professional criteria.
- Permanence and its implications. For civil servants, permanence and professionalism go hand-in-hand. Except where spoils systems are in operation, incoming governments are confronted by the same body of officials who served the outgoing government. In these circumstances, civil servants are forced to become political chameleons, able to work loyally for whichever government happens to be in power, regardless of its political complexion or ideological leanings. Otherwise, their careers will be seriously damaged. In practice, political neutrality therefore means that any personal preferences that civil servants may have are newer so strongly held that they prevent them from faithfully serving any political master.
- Public service ethos. Civil servants, in the main, do not need to be forced to be politically impartial; it is something that is inculcated by the way civil servants are recruited, trained and operate. This occurs in a number of ways. People are drawn to public service by a concern for the larger interests of the state and society, a motivation clearly different from both the partisan passions that drive politicians and the self-interested concerns of those in private business. A public service ethos is also indicated by the arrangements through which civil servants are recruited and trained, with a strong emphasis on cultivating expertise and specialist knowledge.
NO
- Bureaucratic self-interest. For public-choice theorists, civil servants are primarily motivated by career self-interest and, thus, seek the expansion of the agency or department in which they work and an increase in its budget (Niskanen, 1971). This is because bureaucratic growth guarantees job security, expands officials at least greater power, patronage and prestige. Supporters of the New Right therefore often explain the trend towards "big" government in terms of the policy influence exerted by civil servants acting as "nature's social democrats". In order to advance free-market policies successfully, bureaucratic power must be checked or circumvented.
- Conservative power bloc. Socialists, and particularly Marxists, highlight class biases that run through the state bureaucracy, turning senor civil servants into a conservative veto group that dilutes, even blocks, the radical initiatives of socialist governments (Miliband, 2009). This happens, in part, because top civil servants share the same educational and social background as industrialists and business managers, and so share their values, prejudices and general outlook. Higher civil servants also work closely with the world of corporate capitalism, leading, amongst other things, to the "revolving door" through which bureaucrats are increasingly recruited from the private sector, and civil servants are offered lucrative employment opportunities when they retire.
- Departmental culture. Government agencies are not impersonal administrative machines (as suggested by Weber), but social institutions within which develop a set of shared (and usually unquestioned) beliefs, values and assumptions. Such "groupthink" exerts a powerful influence over politicians, who are encouraged to "go native" by the fact that they are both vastly outnumbered by officials and generally recognise that officials possess greater knowledge and expertise than they do themselves. Not uncommonly, a department's culture is also shaped by the nature and interests of the client groups it serves.
References
- Niskanen, W. A. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton).
- Miliband, R. ([1969] 2009) The State in Capitalist Society (London: Merlin).
